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DYNAMIC PRICING AND MINIMUM LENGTH OF STAY CONTROLS AS A HOTEL
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE: ARE THERE CUSTOMER PERCEPTION, ETHICAL, AND
LEGAL QUESTIONS?
Robert H. Wilson, Linda K. Enghagen, and Minwoo Lee
University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA
ABSTRACT. Length of stay controls and dynamic pricing are components of revenue
management tools widely used in the lodging industry. Length of stay controls require guests
to stay for a minimum number of nights, even if they might wish to stay for only one night.
Dynamic pricing characterized by high room rates and length of stay controls are common
when hotel demand is strong for a specific event, such as a college graduation, natural
disasters and emergencies, New Year’s Eve festivities, July 4 fireworks and concerts, or a major
sporting event. While implemented to boost revenue, the combination of dynamic pricing and
length of stay controls can raise ethical, legal, and fairness questions that can lead to adverse
impacts on hotels. Dynamic pricing may be legal or illegal, depending on state law and the
circumstances. Length of stay controls may also be legal or prohibited depending on the state.
The authors suggest some alternatives that will allow hoteliers to comply with existing statutes
and case law and navigate ethical, legal, and fairness questions.
INTRODUCTION
Hotel revenue management systems have
become increasingly more sophisticated in
recent years as hotel operators strive to increase
occupancy rates, revenues, and profits. Rate
and length of stay continue to be key factors in
revenue management (Choi & Kimes, 2002).
In the hospitality industry, revenue manage-
ment has been a key operational strategy to
maximize revenues by utilizing both pricing
(e.g., dynamic pricing, rate fences) and non-
pricing (e.g., overbookings, minimum length of
stay control) revenue management system tools
(Ivanov, 2014; Kimes, 2002).
Length of stay controls (minimum length of
stay requirements) require guests to stay for a
minimum number of nights, even if they might
wish to stay for only one night (Wilson, 2001).
Length of stay controls and significant rate
increases are common when hotel demand is
strong for a specific event, for example, a college
graduation, New Year’s Eve festivities, July 4
fireworks and concerts, or amajor sporting event.
Guests are required to book two or more nights
even if they may only wish to stay for one night,
while also paying substantially increased rates for
the room.
Consumers and news outlets continue to
express dissatisfaction at the apparent unfairness
of some hotel rate setting and length of stay
practices. In this article, we will examine the
reservation practices of the top 5 U.S. hotel
companies for some of their hotels in New York,
San Francisco, andOrlando during the busyNew
Year’s Eve time period to examine whether they
have chosen to implement length of stay controls.
We will then discuss whether those practices
comply with existing state and federal case law
and state statutes. We then study existing state
price gouging statutes and investigate whether
the current rate setting practices by hotel
companies during periods of high demand are
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legal, involve ethical questions, and/or result in
negative customer perception. Possible alterna-
tives to the existing use of length of stay controls
and fairness perceptions are suggested.
Length of Stay Controls as Part of a
Revenue Management System and
Practice
Length of stay controls are now commonly
used in the lodging industry and are identified as
one of the unique features of hotel revenue
management systems (Chiang, Chen, & Xu,
2007). Length of stay controls refers to setting
limits on the minimum and, rarely, maximum
number of nights in customer bookings depend-
ingupondemand (Ivanov&Zhechev, 2012). Past
studies emphasized that length of stay controls
are a key non-pricing revenue management
system tool for hotels to maximize their revenue
and build effective revenue management
systems (Choi & Kimes, 2002; Walls, 2013).
Weatherford (1995) suggested that incorporating
a length of stay control policy into hotel revenue
management systems allowed hotels to obtain an
additional 2.94% in revenues.
Paralee Walls, in her hospitality blog, states
that the “use of length of stay controls during
high-demand periods enables you to control
customer demand, plan for the future, and
maximize revenue. Minimum length of stay
(controls) can be used at any hotel where there
will be a period of high demand (a string of busy
nights) followed by a period of low demand.
By implementing a rule to accept longer-
duration reservations and reject shorter-
duration reservations for arrival during a hot
period, you can fine-tune demand during hot
times to increase occupancy during the slow
period that follows” (Walls, 2013).
Our Length of Stay Controls Survey
While length of stay controls and their use
are widely discussed among industry consult-
ants, academics, and guests, we were not able
to locate any academic studies that actually
document their use. We wanted to conduct a
brief survey to determine whether some of the
top hotel chains were using length of stay
controls in some of their hotels, along with high
rates, during peak demand time periods in
major cities. After determining whether length
of stay controls and high dynamic pricing
models are being used, we will discuss their
legality, perceived fairness, and ethics.
Study Components
During the New Year’s Eve period in 2012,
we studied five top hotel companies in the
three top U.S. tourism states, a time period
characterized by high price and strong demand.
Choice of New Year’s Eve. We chose one
common time period of peak hotel demand
and rates, New Year’s Eve: December 30
and 31, 2012, and January 1 and 2, 2013.
We chose a common time period of peak
demand and peak rates in order to be able to
compare the practices.
Top U. S. Tourism States. We chose to
limit our study to the three top tourism states in
the United States: California, New York, and
Florida, according to IBISWorld industry report
written by Brennan (2013) (Table 1).
Choice of Cities. We then studied three
cities listed as the top 10 domestic destinations
that also hosted major celebrations during New
Year’s Eve during 2013 and were located within
the top three tourism states. The cities chosen
were New York City, Orlando, and San
Francisco (Table 2).
Top U. S. Hotel Companies. The top
hotel chains in theUnited States based onmarket
share revenues are Hilton Hotel Corporation,
Marriott International Inc., InterContinental
TABLE 1. Top U.S. Hotel Companies by U.S. Market Share
Major Hotel Companies
Company Market Share
Hilton Hotels Corporation 14.00%
Marriott International Inc. 13.30%
InterContinental Hotels 8.80%
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc. 4.90%
Wyndham Worldwide Corporation 4.10%
Ramada –
RCI –
Fairfield Communities –
Super 8 Motels –
Travelodge –
Source: IBISWORLD.COM.
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Hotels, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide
Inc., and Wyndham Worldwide (Table 1).
Together the four accounted for an estimated
45.1% of U.S. industry revenue. We were trying
to determine whether any of the brands of the
major companies might be using length of stay
controls (Table 3).
We went to the websites for different
properties within the five top hotel companies
and did a separate search for rooms available
during the New Year’s Eve time period by city
for in New York City, Orlando, and San
Francisco. The study was somewhat random
in that we did not include all brands for each
company. The study was not meant to
determine whether specific brands did or did
not implement length of stay controls, simply to
get information to determine whether length of
stay controls were being used by some hotel
companies in some of their hotels in the cities
chosen.
Results of Hotel Survey
A review of Table 4 indicates that length of
stay controls are used in each of the three cities
studied by some, but not all, of the brands of
the major companies that we studied. A more
detailed study would be necessary to show
exactly which hotels within each brand were/
were not using length of stay controls.
New York City. New York City is known
around the world as one of the best (and most
expensive) places to celebrate New Year’s Eve,
drawing millions of people, either in person
and watching on TV, to celebrate the new year
by watching the dropping of the ball at
midnight in Times Square. And hotel demand
and rates soar during that time period. Our
study examined Hilton, Marriott, InterConti-
nental, Starwood (Sheraton), and Wyndham
(Ramada) hotel properties located near Times
Square to see whether those hotels
implemented length of stay controls.
During October 2013, we attempted to
make a hotel reservation at each of these hotels
for the evening of December 31, 2013, New
Year’s Eve, with a departure date of January 1,
2014. We wanted to see whether we could
make a reservation for just one night on New
Year’s Eve during a time of heavy demand.
All of the hotel websites we searched
indicated that no rooms were available for a
one-night visit, except for one Ramada hotel.
We wanted to then determine whether the
TABLE 2. Top 10 States for Tourism
Top 10 Lists
By Spending By Tax By Employment By Travelers (IBISWORLD.COM 2103 Report)
California California California California
Florida New York Florida Florida
New York Florida Texas New York
Texas Texas New York Texas
Illinois Illinois Nevada Illinois
Nevada Georgia Illinois Nevada
Pennsylvania Nevada Virginia New Jersey
Virginia New Jersey Pennsylvania Pennsylvania
New Jersey Pennsylvania New Jersey Hawaii
Hawaii Minnesota Ohio Georgia
Note. Original Source: U.S. Travel Association (2011). Summarized and reproduced based on an industry report made by
TravelEffect.com.
TABLE 3. Top Domestic Destinations
Rank City State
1 Las Vegas NV
2 New York City NY
3 Orlando FL
4 San Diego CA
5 Los Angeles CA
6 Chicago IL
7 San Francisco CA
8 Washington DC
9 Houston TX
10 San Antonio TX
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hotels that indicated that there were no rooms
available were really sold out or if they had
rooms available on December 31, but only if
we were willing to book for two or three nights.
We then tried to make a reservation arriving on
December 30 and departing on either January
1 or January 2, a stay of two or three nights.
Some had rooms available for the evening of
December 31 if we were willing to book for two
nights, and more had rooms available if we
were willing to book for three nights, a clear
indication that these hotels had implemented
length of stay controls.
Table 4 reflects that some of the hotels had
implemented length of stay controls that
prevented a guest from reserving a room for
just one night on December 31, but did allow
the guest to stay on December 31 if they
booked for a total of at least two nights.
In order to verify and preserve our results
and because the controls and rates constantly
change, we obtained screen shots of all of the
FIGURE 1. 1 Screen shot of Hilton Reservation Page December 31, 2013, January 1 and 2, 2014. 1-night stay from December 31, 2013 to
January 1, 2014.
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hotel website reservation page results for the
dates, cities, and hotels studied. As an example,
the screen shots at the Hilton Times Square,
New York, shows no rooms available for the one
night of December 31, 2013 (New Year’s Eve),
but shows rooms being available at the same
hotel if we booked for two or three nights
(Figures 1, 2, and 3).
Orlando. In Orlando, we did exactly as
we did in New York, attempting to make a
reservation just for the evening of December
31, a one-night stay, at the same hotel chains
and properties. And our results were similar to
what we found in New York.
No rooms were available for a stay on just
December 31 at some of the Hilton, Marriott,
InterContinental, and Sheraton hotels we
surveyed. We were able to make reservations
at most of the same hotels for the evening
of December 31 if we booked for a stay of at
least two nights that included January 1 and/or
January 2, 2014, indicating that length of stay
controls were in place. Ramada hotels in
Orlando did not have length of stay controls
FIGURE 2. 2-night stay from December 30, 2013 to January 1, 2014.
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in place and allowed reservations for the
desired one night of December 31.
San Francisco. In San Francisco, a similar
pattern was evident. At the hotels studied,
Marriott and Hilton had length of stay controls
that prevented a guest from making a
reservation for just December 31, but both
allowed the guest to make a reservation for
December 31 if the guest was willing to arrive
on December 30 for a two-day length of stay.
The InterContinental, Sheraton, and Ramada
hotels that we studied did not have length of
stay controls in San Francisco for the evening of
December 31, allowing for a one-night stay.
Discussion of Survey Results
Most travelers are aware that hotels,
airlines, and transportation companies make
use of different forms of dynamic pricing
models during high-demand periods. Each
hotel company forecasts demand for their
properties that differs from one property to
another and from one brand to another, even
within the same city, resulting in the use of
FIGURE 3. 3-night stay from December 30, 2013 to January 2, 2014.
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dynamic pricing to set rates and decisions to
implement or not implement length of stay
controls.
As expected, some hotel companies
maintained length of stay controls, while others
did not, even for the same time period, within
the same city. Some hotel companies main-
tained length of stay controls in some cities, but
not others. Our review was not meant to be
exhaustive and did not attempt to determine
whether specific hotel companies, brands, or
properties did or did not engage in length of
stay controls, but generally, to determine
whether length of stay controls are used at
certain times by some hotel companies at some
properties. These results allow us to frame our
discussion of customer perceptions and legal
issues relating to rates and length of stay
controls and dynamic pricing.
The Legal Obligation to Provide a Room
The duty of innkeepers to serve the public
established in the English common law
included a range of “duties” innkeepers owed
the public generally and guests in particular.
Included in these duties are both the “duty to
admit the public” and the “duty to refrain from
discrimination” (Sherry, 1993, p. 39, p. 43). The
famous 1701 English case Lane v. Cotton, cited
in many United States Supreme Court cases,
includes the widely quoted language of Lord
Holt:
If an innkeeper refuses to entertain a guest
where his house is not full, an action will lie
against him. (Lane v. Cotton, 1701,
p. 1464).
The English common law duty to provide a
room is followed today in many of our state and
federal courts. The United States Supreme
Court continues to state that innkeepers have a
duty to serve the general public and are subject
to state regulation. The 1876 case of Munn v.
Illinois relied on Lane v. Cotton when it
recognized the duty of innkeepers (among
other types of businesses serving the public)
to serve all guests, while also determining
that that:
. . . it has been customary in England from
time immemorial, and in this country from
its first colonization, to regulate ferries,
common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers,
wharfingers, innkeepers . . . (Munn v. Illi-
nois, 1876, p. 26).
In the 1962 United States Supreme Court
case, Justice William Douglas stated, in a
concurring opinion:
As stated by Holt, C. J., in Lane v. Cotton, 12
Mod. 472, 484 (1701): “If an innkeeper
refuse to entertain a guest where his house
is not full, an action will lie against him . . .”
(Lombard v. Louisiana, 1962, p. 277).
State Case Law and Statutes: California,
Florida, and New York
California Case Law and Statutes. Cali-
fornia classifies innkeepers as common carriers
with a duty to serve all who request service,
subject to reasonable regulations, as established
under California’s criminal law, dating back to
1872, but still valid today.
Innkeepers and carriers refusing to rece-
ive guests and passengers. Every person, and
every agent or officer of any corporation carrying
on business as an innkeeper, or as a common
carrier of passengers, who refuses, without just
cause or excuse, to receive and entertain any
guest, or to receive and carry any passenger, is
guilty of a misdemeanor (California Penal Code
§365, 1872).
Under California law, misdemeanors carry a
possible sentence of up to six months in a
county jail or a fine of up to $1000 dollars or
both (California Penal Code §19, 2013).
California courts have continued to uphold
and enforce the duty of innkeepers to provide a
room. In an older case, Willis v. McMahon, the
California Supreme Court found that an
innkeeper who refuses accommodations with-
out just cause is not only liable in damages but
is guilty of a misdemeanor (Willis v. McMahon,
1891, p. 650). In a more recent 1950 California
Court of Appeals case, the court stated, “At
common law innkeepers were under a duty to
furnish accommodations to all persons in the
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absence of some reasonable grounds” (Perrine
v. Paulos, 1950, p. 656). In a 1977 California
Court of Appeals ruling, the court again
confirms the innkeeper’s obligation: “In fact,
an innkeeper who refuses accommodations
without just cause (such as inability to pay,
infectious disease, or the like) is not only civilly
liable but is guilty of a misdemeanor”
(Archibald v. Cinerama Hawaiian Hotels, Inc.,
1977, p. 599).
While there are no reported cases involving
guests suing hotel companies because of length
of stay controls, the statutory and case law
continues to be the law of the land in California
and would apply if such a suit were brought.
New York Case Law and Statutes. New
York statutory and case law follows the English
common law doctrine of including innkeepers
as common carriers who owe a duty to provide
accommodations to travelers in the absence of
a reasonable basis for refusing lodging. Like
California, New York treats an innkeeper’s
unlawful refusal of accommodations to a guest
as a criminal misdemeanor. The New York
criminal code provides as follows:
Innkeepers and carriers refusing to rece-
ive guests and passengers. A person, who,
either onhis ownaccount or as agent or officer of
a corporation, carries on business as innkeeper,
or as common carrier of passengers, and refuses,
without just cause or excuse, to receive and
entertain any guest, or to receive and carry any
passenger, is guilty of amisdemeanorNYCLSCiv
R §40-e (2013)
New York courts continue to follow the
common law and statutes: “At common law, a
person engaged in a public calling, such as
innkeeper or common carrier, was held to be
under a duty to the general public and was
obliged to serve . . . all who sought service”
(Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, Inc.,
1947, p. 253) In a more recent case involving
this question, a 1988 New York Supreme Court
reiterated its support for the common law rule
when it cited the 1908 case of De Wolf v. Ford,
stating that for “centuries it has been settled in all
jurisdictions where the common law prevails,
the business of an innkeeper is of a quasi public
character. [He] impliedly invites the public to his
establishment [and] is bound * * * to accept as
guests all proper persons so long as he has room
for them” (Ness v. Pan American World Airways
et al., 1988, p. 374).While there are no reported
cases involving guests being denied a room
because of length of stay controls, the statutory
and case law continues to be the law of the land
in New York and would apply if such a suit were
brought today.
Florida Case Law and Statutes. Of the
top three states for tourism included in our
study, Florida does not follow the common law
duty requiring an innkeeper to admit all guests
requesting a room. In 1957, Florida abrogated
the innkeepers’ common law duty to receive
guests (Peirsol, 1962).
Florida has enacted Florida Statutes Section
509.092 classifying the the owners of public
lodging establishments as private enterprises
giving them the prerogative to deny a room to a
guest as long as thedenial is not discriminatory in
nature (Florida Statutes Section 509.092 n.d.).
Public lodging establishments and public
food service establishments; rights as private
enterprises. Public lodging establishments and
public food service establishments are private
enterprises, and the operator has the right to
refuse accommodations or service to any person
who is objectionable or undesirable to the
operator, but such refusal may not be based
upon race, creed, color, sex, physical disability, or
national origin. A person aggrieved by a violation
of this section or a violation of a rule adopted
under this section has a right of action pursuant to
s. 760.11.
The Florida statute does allow length of stay
controls.
Conclusions as to the Legality of Length of
Stay Controls in California, New York, and
Florida
Based on case and statutory law, length of
stay controls are illegal in California and New
York, but legal in Florida.
Limitations and Additional Questions
Needing Further Study
There are no reported cases involving
questions regarding the duty to admit a guest
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or involving length of stay controls. The lack of
litigation should not be taken to mean that the
practice is lawful or unlawful or whether it is
considered ethical or fair by guests. Cases of
first impression are frequently filed, and the
court must decide based on prior case law,
common law, and statutes. Existing statutes in
California and New York are still valid; they are
old and there is no case law on them, but on
their face they appear to outlaw length of stay
controls.
Almost all guest visits at hotels occur
without a problem and almost all guests have
no reason to contemplate legal actions. Guests
are reluctant to sue hotels in cases that do not
involve personal injury, as they are very costly
and difficult to pursue. The guest is likely to live
a great distance from the hotel and litigation
would normally need to be filed in the state
where the hotel is located. The amount of
damages recoverable is usually relatively small.
When the guest discovers the significant up-
front cost of legal fees and the fact that legal fees
cannot be recovered from the hotel, most
practical people will decide not to pursue a
legal claim. While most states do have small
claims courts available to handle suits of small
amounts (usually between $1,000 and
$10,000), the guest would still have take the
time and expense to travel to the small claims
court in the city or county where the hotel is
located. The result is that even though the hotel
may have violated the law, most individual
guests will choose not to pursue any legal action
against the hotel for what appears to be a
relatively small amount of damages.
The statutes and case law also do not
answer the question of whether the duty to
provide a room is met when a guest who wishes
to book for one night only is told by the hotel
that a room is available for that night but only
with a minimum length of stay. The authors
believe that the duty to provide a room is not
met by offering a room but requiring a
miniumum length of stay.
It should be noted that each state may
choose to regulate or not regulate hotels and
their duty to admit guests. As a result, hoteliers
should consult local counsel to determine the
specific law in each state where they conduct
business.
Dynamic Pricing
In a recent MIT technology review article
(Surowiecki, 2014) discussing the Uber trans-
portation company’s pricing model, James
Surowiecki states that “dynamic pricing is a
way for companies to maximize profits by
exploiting demand—charging higher prices to
people who can and will pay more.” As MIT
professor Yossi Sheffi has put it, it’s the “science
of squeezing every possible dollar from
customers.” That’s because most industries
that use dynamic pricing have a limited
inventory (an airline flight has a set number of
seats, a hotel a set number of rooms) and are
trying to make as much money from selling that
inventory as possible.
“At the heart of revenue management
systems is changing rates and price based
upon demand. When unconstrained demand
exists, a hotel can choose the customers willing
to pay the most” (Kimes, 2010). “Dynamic
pricing involves changing prices over time in
response to demand uncertainty (usually, you
decrease your price in an attempt to stimulate
demand, or increase prices in response to
strong demand)” (Kimes & Anderson, 2011).
Using dynamic pricing results in significant
price changes over a range of time periods.
In an article by Carter Wilson, director of STR
analytics, price ranges for a set of Times Square
New York hotels during an 18-month period
leading up to (and shortly after) New Year’s Eve
2011, “the average daily rate (ADR) perform-
ance of the Times Square hotel sample ranged
from a low of $169 (February 5, 2012) to a high
of $443 (New Year’s Eve 2011)” (Wilson, 2012).
When Dynamic Pricing Becomes Price
Gouging
Hotel guests and government agencies
sometimes question the legality and ethical
practices of dynamic pricing models used by
hotels when they drastically increase their nightly
rates during times of natural disasters andpopular
events and at other times of high room demand.
In a 2012 study, 34 states were found to have
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anti–price gouging statutes that prohibit certain
types of pricing during, and immediately after,
certain types of events (Giberson, 2012).
A review of these statutes indicates some
similarities within the statutes. Most carry a
monetary penalty per violation and most are
enforceable by state attorneys general. Some
allow for private individual suits. While the
definition of price gougingdiffers among the state
statutes, all of the statutes limit price gouging
violations to periods of declared states of
emergency or during periods of natural disasters.
The types of business that are regulated by these
statutes include “consumer goods and services,”
“essential commodities,” “petroleum products,”
“services needed by victims of disasters,” etc.
Many of the statutes apply to hotels, while some
clearly do not. (See http://apps.americanbar.org/
antitrust/at-committees/at-fe/pdf/programs/
spring-06/price-gouging-statutes.pdf)
Examples of Illegal Hotel Price Gouging
During and immediately after Hurricane
Sandy in 2012, public outrage was directed at
some businesses and hotels for the high rates
that were charged. Several hotels and
businesses were sued and paid fines pursuant
to violations of state price gouging statutes (See
Beekman, 2013; O’Neill, 2013; Cassi, 2014;
Booth, 2012).
While the existing price gouging statutes are
enforceable during the defined types of natural
disasters and emergencies discussed above,
revenue management dynamic pricing models
are not currently regulated if there is no natural
disaster or declared state of emergency falling
within the definitions created by the statutes.
When Dynamic Pricing Is Legal
Consumer Outrage and Perceptions of
Unfairness at High Hotel Prices. Notwith-
standing the definition of illegal price gouging,
consumers and news outlets are sometimes
outraged by what they consider to be excessive
pricing and minimum length of stay require-
ments by hotels during non-natural disaster
periods of high demand for hotel rooms. They
question the unfairness, ethics, and legality of
the high prices. The hotels and others claim that
their rates andminimum lengths of stay are legal
and ethical and are based on simple supply and
demand and dynamic pricing models. They
further argue that their hotel rooms are a
perishable product and that they lower prices
during low demand and raise prices during high
demand. But to many consumers, a perception
of unfairness and “price gouging” is evident.
It should be noted that consumer outrage over
high hotel prices is often combined with similar
outrage over minimum length of stay controls:
“Hotels near race tracks often jack their
prices up three to four times the normal
rate on race weekends—and many require
three-night minimum stays, turning fans
away who only want to spend one night
and see the race” (RacingWin, 2012).
“The three-night minimum prompted an
email to Buffett from shareholder Christo-
pher Bloomstran of St. Louis, whose stay at
the Old Market Embassy Suites, one of the
most popular hotels for the meeting, will
cost $1,414.38, including taxes, even
though he can stay only two nights because
he’s squeezing the trip between a business
meeting and a child’s sports event” (Jordon
& Epley, 2014).
“The Boar’s Head Inn, for example, charges
$411 per night with a three-night minimum
stay during graduation weekend. The rate,
which includes breakfast for two, is
between 50% and 80% higher than its
normal weekend rate (McNeill, 2010).
“Because some hotel rooms in downtown
Indianapolis, if you can find them on the
black market, are renting for more than
$4,000 a night, with a four-night minimum
stay” (Manahan, 2012).
The dynamic pricing model of setting of rates
based on demand is a basic and critical element
of most revenue management systems, and the
practices do appear to be legal and do not
appear to violate the price gouging statutes.
Questions of Perceived Customer
Fairness
Because consumers and news organizations
appear to be so concerned regarding pricing
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and length of stay controls and they tend to be
used simultaneously by hotels, questions of
perceived customer fairness and ethical ques-
tions are raised, and these perceptions may
affect future business. While the statutes define
price gouging only during the specified periods
of natural disaster and declared emergency,
consumers and others often define price
gouging in a more subjective way. While
making the argument that there was no price
gouging after Hurricane Sandy in the group of
hotels studied, Carter Wilson (supra) also
mentions that “Price gouging is generally used
to describe pricing above what is considered
fair.” (Wilson, 2012)
Unfairness and Ethical Considerations
Viewed from the traditional economicmodel
of supply anddemand, length of stay controls and
other revenue management techniques are
legitimate strategies for maximizing revenue by
increasing or decreasing prices as hotels experi-
ence commensurate increases or decreases in
demand for rooms. As a matter of social policy,
laws prohibiting price gouging during natural
disasters andother declaredemergencies areone
limitation imposed on the hotel industry (and
others) to prevent businesses from unfairly
capitalizing on such tragedies. However, while
the law places such limitations on hotels under
these kinds of limited circumstances, customers
see a wider range of pricing practices as unfair
and therefore unethical.
In 2002, Kimes noted that most customers
accept the economic “principle of dual
entitlement.” That is, they accept the prop-
osition that as customers they are entitled to
pay a fair price and businesses are entitled to
earn a fair profit. On its face, that sounds
straightforward enough. In reality, garnering
consensus on what is fair can be quite difficult.
As Kimes (2002) noted: “Customers generally
view justified price differences (or differences
they perceive to be justified) as fair, but they
view unjustified price increases to be unfair.” To
move from such general propositions to a
greater degree of specificity, Kimes examined
which types of practices customers found to be
acceptable (i.e., fair) as opposed to unaccep-
table (i.e., unfair) when employing revenue
management strategies for the sale of hotel
rooms.
. Acceptable revenue management
practices
. Pricing information (including different
pricing options) is made available to
customers
. Customers receive substantial discounts
in exchange for restrictions or limitations
to the terms of their reservation
. Different products or packages are sold
at different price points, such as
different weekday and weekend prices
or packages that include some meals,
spa treatments, or other amenities
. Unacceptable revenue management
practices
. Discounts that are insufficient in light of
the restrictions or limitations placed on
the terms of the reservation
. Changing the terms and conditions of
the booking process or reservation
without appropriately informing the
customer
Consequences of Perceived Customer
Fairness/Unfairness
Negative reactionsby customerswho feel that
they have been treated unfairly and therefore
unethically do have consequences for the
business. Kimes (2010) suggested that customers
believe that if a company behaves in an unfair
fashion, they are not likely to patronize that
company in the future. On the other hand, when
customers consider hotel revenue management
practices as fair, they aremore likely to be satisfied
with the hotel and tend to return to that hotel in
the future (Taylor & Kimes, 2010).
Many studies have been completed dealing
with the perception by customers of unfair
treatment by businesses and the negative
consequences that result. If customers view a
firm’s practices as unfair, negative consumer
responses are likely. Immediate attitudinal and
affective responses include dissatisfaction
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(Oliver & Swan, 1989), lower purchase
intentions (Campbell, 1999), and negative
word-of-mouth intentions (Blodgett, Granbois,
& Walters, 1993; Blodgett, Hill, & Tax, 1997;
Noone, 2012). Short-term gains through
revenue management may be offset by a
negative impact on longer-term profitability
(Wirtz & Kimes, 2007). More recently, Lee and
Jeong (2015) demonstrated that customers
consider hotel length of stay control practices
as unfair, such perceived unfairness leading to
an increase in negative word-of-mouth inten-
tions and a decrease in willingness to book.
Suggestions to Stay Within the Law, Avoid
Lawsuits, and Improve Customer
Perception
Eliminate Length of Stay Controls in the
States Where Length of Stay Controls Are
Determined to Be a Possible Legal
Issue. The choice would be unpopular for
hotels, as they would probably lose revenue.
They would, however, be complying with the
laws of their particular state. The management
decisision would be based on a state-by-state
analysis to determine whether the state stautues
allow or do not allow length of stay controls.
If the practice is lawful in a particular state,
transparency and explanations to customers
would improve negative perceptions of
unfairness.
Combine the Elimination a Required
Length of Stay Controls With Sizeable
Increase in the Rates for the Specific Nights
of High Demand. If a guest chooses to stay
for just one night, they would pay an extremely
high rate, but they would be able to stay for just
one night. The hotel would be complying with
existing statutory and case law and might be
able to realize a similar amount of revenue.
While the guest might be upset by paying a very
high rate for that one night, they would be able
to stay for only the time desired.
Give Guests a Choice Between High Rates
for a One-Night Stay or Lower Rates That Also
Include a Voluntary Minimum Length of Stay
by Implementing Full Pattern Length of Stay
Controls. Airline companies have, in the past,
given flyers a choice between paying a high
price or offering a lower price if they choose to
stay in a city for a Saturday and Sunday. Let the
guest decide whether they wish to increase the
duration of their stay (and pay less per night) or
pay a high rate to stay just during the desired
time. “Full pattern length of stay controls allow a
hotel to accept a discount rate up to a peak
period, say one- and two-night lengths of stay,
not allowing stays at this discount rate for the
peak, but then again open up this discount rate
for longer lengths of stay, thus improving
occupancy on the shoulder days and increasing
overall revenues. In addition, hotels incur
incremental variable costs that cause a
multiple-night reservation to generate more
profits than single-night reservations at the
same rate (Wilson, 2015).
a. Table 4 indicates that some hotel compa-
nies may already be following this sugges-
tion and giving their guests a choice: paying
a high rate for a stay on just December 31 or
having a lower rate for a two- or three-night
minimum stay.
b. Increase the length of stay time require-
ments even further to give the guests an
additional option to bring down the
average nightly cost. A longer length of
stay might provide the hotel with the
additional revenue while lowering the
average nightly cost.
Disclose on Marketing and Online Sites
That the Hotel Has a Minimum Length of
Stay Requirement and Attempt to Explain
to the Consumer the Rationale for the
Policy. Consumers’ perceptions usually show
that consumers react more positively when
information is transparent and provided.
Disclose in the Terms and Conditions
(Part of All Online Hotel Reservations) That
the Hotel Has Minimum Length of Stay
Requirements So That the Guest Is Aware of
the Policy and Agrees to the Length of Stay
Controls. Assent by the guest to a practice
will tend to minimize the chances that a guest
120 R. H. WILSON ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 M
as
sa
ch
us
ett
s, 
Am
he
rst
] a
t 1
5:1
5 2
9 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
will later complain, litigate, or be successful in
litigation.
Require the Guest to Agree to a Choice of
ForumProvision andaChoice of LawProvision
in Guest Terms and Conditions. Require that
all suits be filed in and use the state law of a state
that allows length of stay controls.
Increase Hotel and Industry Disclosure
and Transparency on the Subject of Pricing
and Length of Stay Controls as a Way to
Provide More Transparency and Improve
Customer Perceptions. Have professional
associations attempt to influence the change
of state legislation to allow the use of length of
stay controls.
Conclusion and Implications for Lodging
Companies
Based on our survey of the most popular
cities and states for tourism and lodging, it is
clear that the use of length of stay controls and
dynamic pricing are implemented by some, but
not all, companies during periods of high
demand. These length of stay controls require a
minimum stay of at least two nights and prevent
a potential guest from booking a stay for only
one night. Of the three states studied, California
and New York follow the common law and
each have statutes that require a hotel to
provide a room to a guest who requests one if
there is a room available. The authors conclude
that hotel companies in these states violate the
law by imposing length of stay controls.
The third state studied, Florida, does not follow
the common law and has passed a legislation
that allows a hotel to implement length of stay
controls.
Thirty-four states have legislation outlawing
price gouging during defined periods of natural
disaster or declared emergency. Hotels are not
restricted in their pricing power during times
other than those defined natural disasters and
declared emergencies.
Evidence of consumer dissatisfaction and
perceived unfairness continues to exist against
the use of high dyanmic pricing and minimum
length of stay requirements during periods of
high room demand and may result in negative
consequences for the hotels.
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